Columbia
Shuttle Crash: A Communications Confluence of Nut Island, Structural Holes,
Paradoxes and More
Academic article: Locate, read and
summarize an academic article that presents a related theory, case example,
etc. Draw connections between the ideas in the article and those you read for
class.
Our module’s focus on Teams brings to mind a
few concepts that tie into each other in order to achieve goals and
objectives. One of those concepts is
Transactive Memory Theory. In 2007, Majcharzak, Jarvenpaa, and
Hollingshead addressed Transactive Memory and its application with regards to
emergent groups during disasters.
Especially during emergency disaster
situations, transactive memory among groups does have some different
characteristics to the makeup of the group as well as the intentions
(volition) of some of the individuals, particularly if some of the members were
spontaneously attached to the group (Majcharazak, Jarvenpaa & Hollingshead,
2007). There are interesting theories
and conclusions to consider as communication professionals.
But what about other types of crisis
events that aren’t natural disaster-related?
I found that “It’s Not What You Know: A Transactive Memory Analysis of
Knowledge Networks at NASA” by Johny T. Garner (2006) pulled many aspects of
team management (Hill, 1995) transactive memory, the Nut Island Theory (Levy, 2001), formal and
informal networks and strategic communication in research centered around the
Columbia Space Shuttle project and the communication errors that may have
contributed to the shuttle’s crash. This
article not only gave me a sense of what we will be addressing in our own
section assignments this week, but also a real feel of how a crucial crisis “event”
can occur in our own job environments.
Early on in the article, Garner sets
up the importance of transactive memory by defining knowledge networks, asserting that within
organizations, a “finite limit” of
knowledge that one person can possess and through connections with others in
his or her network defines themselves as part of a knowledge network (p 330,
Garner, 2006). Some of this network “selection,”
or the forming of a network by a person, can be unconscious, but a factor
affecting that forming process is known as homophily, where people select
others into their network who are similar to them (Garner, 2006). Cliqueish?
Maybe; some might say “comfortable.”
While some people may value those
strong ties to another who has similar characteristics and knowledge, however those ties don’t create an effective
transactive memory system in a group. Finding
the differences in knowledge and “leapfrogging” over those structural holes to
create weak ties is key in creating/strengthening a transactive memory network
(Burt, 1997 and Wegner, 1987). Garner (2006) hypothesizes that the
communication network of NASA on the Columbia project was due to organizational
hierarchy and poses research questions to investigate the characteristics of
the communication system at NASA and whether it resembles a transactive memory
system.
Garner (2006) utilizes the following
sources in his research method: consumer
news articles on the crash and its aftermath, content analysis of NASA emails
and meeting minutes of the teams and transcripts from the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board. Additionally, sociograms of the
team, the hierarchy network and an ideal transactive memory system are
presented (Garner, 2006).
While the information shared
includes portions of emails from key Columbia communications personnel, which I
found fascinating, I also must acknowledge the limitations and lack of access
that the researchers mention in the study (Garner, 2006). Key personnel were not available or included
in this research, and no face-to-face interviews were included as part of any
content analysis(Garner, 2006). That
type of omission does provide a more narrow, if comprehensive, glimpse into the
structural organization and team management miscues.
I was pleased to have found this article, but
the topic was not an easy one to tackle. I guess we’ll find out more about this
event next week. Still, lessons far less
deadly can be learned and shared to avoid repeating past injustices as long as the
academic process continues.
R. S. Burt, (1997). The Contingent Value of Social Capital. Administrative Science Quarterly
42,
339-365
Garner, J.
(2006). It’s Not What You Know: A
Transactive Memory Analysis of Knowledge
Networks at NASA. Journal
of Technical Writing and Communication, 36(4), 329-351
Hill, L. (1995)
Managing Your Team, Harvard Business School, pp. 1-22
Levy, Paul.
(2001) The Nut Island Effect: When Good Teams Go Wrong, Harvard Business
Review, 5-12
Majcharzak, A., Jarvenpaa, S., and Hollingshead, A. (2007).
Coordinating expertise
among emergent
groups responding to disasters. Organization
Science, 18(1),
147-161.
D. M. Wegner, R. Erber, and P. Raymond, Transactive Memory in Close
Relationships,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61:6, pp. 923-929, 1991.
Al, it seems this article bridges at least three weeks of our class: networks, teams, and organizational culture (when we will be covering the Columbia disaster). From this article and the readings, it seems that managers have to fight homophily for a variety of reasons. While there are clearly drawbacks to similarity in groups, do you think there are also some drawbacks of diversity? How should leaders manage these potential issues?
ReplyDeleteAl,
ReplyDeleteThis was a great post. I know we had discussed this a little bit in my application assignment last week, but I find it extremely interesting that there is an actual name given to the psychological choice people make to expand their network by seeking out people like themselves. I loved the comment about how 'leapfrogging' over structural holes between diverse group members creates transactive memory. I think this is not only the best way to build a team, but also to build your personal network. There is nothing like being able to connect with people who share different skill sets and knowledge then you. While the connection might not be strong at first, it can create a better team or network over time.
Really interesting stuff, would love to discuss it further!
Andrew
Andrew,
DeleteThanks for the reply.
You know, I was thinking about you and the comment Courtney made last week regarding homophily. Glad you read this one. And I hadn't heard of the word before Courtney mentioned it, either. About leapfrogging, I know that isn't an academic term, just one that I thought might be a way to describe bridging nodes (?) and connecting with non-redudant players. In essence, we are doing it in groups, and reading Rath's (2007)the Strengthfinders book and finding out our talents helps us get to the problem quicker, I believe.
As a coach, I guess you already know the skills of players by the (way before) beginning of the season. Scouting, recruit's submitted videos, online sites like scout.com and the like get you to your goal earlier and closer than not using those tools.
I'm sure its a bonus if you can get players who are not only achievers, but have positivity, harmony, belief, competition, consistency and responsibility, you'd have a pretty coachable team. Though I just saw the Deacons are 6-0 in the CACC, so I guess you already have that!
Rath, T. (2007). Strengthsfinder 2.0. New York: Gallup Press
Hi Courtney,
ReplyDeleteI do think there are drawbacks to diversity. In obtaining non-redundant players, the expectation of creating a robust, strong network begins with and developing them to become redundant players (Burt, 1997). In an emergent event, however, the effects could be dangerous and even deadly, due to a situation in great flux (Majcharzak et al., 2007). In a non-emergent situation, I think Hill (1995) addresses it diversity best when discussing paradoxes for managers of teams.
R. S. Burt, (1997). The Contingent Value of Social Capital. Administrative Science Quarterly
42, 339-365
Hill, L. (1995) Managing Your Team, Harvard Business School, pp. 1-22
Majcharzak, A., Jarvenpaa, S., and Hollingshead, A. (2007). Coordinating expertise among emergent groups responding to disasters. Organization Science, 18(1),
147-161.
Hi Al, Good find in the Garner article; your post this week about NASA really caught my attention. Reviewing the team dynamics during the Columbia Space Shuttle mission is an interesting communication study. For teams that have to function this is such an interesting topic. The Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa and Hollingshead (2007) article proposes that the same methods for knowledge sharing and coordination that work for set teams may need to be revised to work effectively for emergent teams. This makes me curious about the team dynamics for those on the Columbia Space Shuttle mission. They were a set team who had presumably worked together for some. When the crisis occurred, do you think the group dynamics changed?
ReplyDelete