Organizational Structures of the Military: A Soldier’s Perspective

In thinking of organizational structures, their complexity and ever changing nature, I decided to interview a colleague who recently joined my organization. Tom brings a depth and breath of knowledge and experience given his 20 years in the US Air Force, his management consulting experience and his current role as Senior Project Manager at the College Board. His father was in the military and his two sons are also in the military, so he was able to share their experiences as well as his own.

We decided to focus our interview on the organizational structure of the military and its evolution throughout their military careers.  The military as described by Tom seemed like a perfect example of bureaucracy with the advantages highlighted by Wren & Bedeian (2009) such as “division of labor, managerial hierarchy, formal selection, career orientation, formal rules and other controls and impersonality” (p.231).  However, the strict bureaucracy that his father experienced, and which was very present when Tom joined, eventually evolved due to environmental, political, economic and technological changes (personal communication, February 10, 2012).

According to Tom, when he first joined the Air Force, the structure was more functional with a very strict vertical hierarchical chain of command (Daft, 2007).  Communication flowed from top to bottom and lateral communication with other branches was not as common.  He mentioned that promotions were based on the hierarchical “rule of 3” where in order to become a supervisor you needed to have 3 subordinates (personal communication, February 10, 2012).  This is in line with the functional and hierarchical structures also described by Nohria (2005). One benefit that he saw from the hierarchical structure was that “you only had one boss to take orders from” (personal communication, February 10, 2012) so the chain of command was very well established and there was no room for confusion as you always knew who you worked for.

The fact that their job changed every three years and that they were assigned to different units, which was more of a divisional structure, was also seen as positive.  Change was common and he and his peers became flexible and developed new skills in their new divisons.  Training as well as knowledge transfer was extremely important and everyone had a standard 3-bind book (sometimes called the bible) which gave them all the information they needed to do their respective jobs (Daft, 2007).  The cons of such a structure was that constant training, reshuffling and change was expensive and in some cases training was at lest 30% of a unit’s budget, therefore resource efficiency was not maximized (Nohria, 1995, p.19) .  

Tom joined the military during the cold war and he witnessed how the economic and political forces changed the organizational structure over the years.  In his opinion, the cold war was fought with the “threat of nuclear gloom” (personal communication, February 10, 2012) and without the need for actual combat.  Once the cold war was over, he saw a shift in focus to chemical warfare and terrorism.  The specialized teams such as the navy seals and delta force became more visible and active. This reminded me of Goold & Campbell’s (2002) description of the developments of “platforms” under the parent proposition.  In this case, specialized units/platforms were created to strategically approach combat in a new way and gain a competitive advantage over their enemies. These units definitely needed “distinct cultures” in order to thrive and be effective in a larger military environment (Goold & Campbell, 2002, p. 8). According to Tom, their functional form allowed the Navy Seals and Delta Force teams to be more flexible and agile and begin combating the new threats facing the nation.

As technology and communication methods evolved, the military also had to adapt to new threats in its environment.  Cyber-assaults, new methods of collecting intelligence by tracking terrorists, digital intelligence, and tracking funding to terrorist agencies required a system that was more flexible (personal communication, February 10, 2012). However, a new structural design that allowed for more horizontal communication and gave access to information at lower levels is what Tom believes caused a single individual, Pfc. Bradley Manning, to steal and leak classified material as published in the New York Times.  This example reminded me of the “learning from mistakes” Barings case described by Applegate (1995) and Tom agreed with her statement regarding the importance of hierarchy in these type of cases since “authority systems limit decision making and actions by strict segregation of responsibility and duties, standardization of jobs, direct supervision, and restricted access to information/assets everywhere, but the very top of the firm” (p.6).  Information availability at the Pfc. level in the military as well as decision making power at lower ranks, as was the case in the Oracle case study, make organizations vulnerable and able to justify the need for “standard rules and procedures across divisions” (Daft 2007, p.94) with ultimate vertical control as the main approach to avoid embarrassing and costly situations.

With the introduction of technology and a changing environment, he believes some parts of the military adopted more of a network structure (personal communication, February 10, 2012). I showed him all the structures presented by Nohria (1995) and he identified the network structure as the system currently used on the ground in Afghanistan and up until recently in Iraq.  Both of his sons were stationed in these countries and from what he knows about their experience, he felt the network structure was at play in these combat zones.  For instance, many key functions were given to subcontractors, they had to coordinate with joint forces from multiple countries in cross-functional teams, and the importance of alliances and informal structures could mean the difference between life and death (personal communication, February 10, 2012).  Finally, he feels that since the military is overextended and in a “very volatile” environment where “efficiency, adaptability and responsiveness” (Nohria, 1995, p.17) to environmental forces are extremely important, this structure might give the troops in the ground a higher chance for success and survival (personal communication, February 10, 2012).

References

Applegate, L.  (1995). Managing in and informational age: Organizational challenges and opportunities  Boston, MA:  Harvard Business School Publishing.

Daft, R. (2007). Fundamentals of organizational structure. Organization Theory and Design (9th ed.), pp. 88-125 (Chapter 3)

Goold, M. & Campbell, A. (2002). Do You Have a Well Designed Organization? Harvard

Business Review.

Nohria, N. (1995). Note on organizational structure. Harvard Business School.

Savage, C. (2011, March 3). Soldier faces 22 new wikiLeaks charges. New York Times, p. A6(L). Retrieved February 12, 2012, from Academic OneFile (GALE|A250433700).

Wren, D., & Bedeian, A. (2009). The Advent of Scientific Management. In Johnson, L. & Dosi,      C. M. (Eds.), The Evolution of Management Thought pp. 212-234 (Six Edition). New Jersey: George Hoffman.